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UNITED STATES v. ARMSTRONG
21 E3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1994)
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
FACTS
The United States appealed the dismissal of in-
dictments against defendants Christopher
Armstrong, Aaron Hampton, Freddie Mack, Shelton
Martin, and Robert Rozelle. The indictments were
dismissed as a sanction for violating a discovery or-
der issued by District Court Judge Consuelo Bland
Marshall.
A joint task force of Inglewood Narcotics Divi-
sion detectives, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms (ATF), and three confidential informants
infiltrated a drug distribution ring. The arrest, made
in conjunction with the investigation, snared the
defendants with close to 135 grams of cocaine base
(commonly known as "crack") and multiple firearms.
A federal grand jury returned indictments against
all the defendants for conspiracy to distribute co-
caine base under 21 U.S.C. § 846. Some of the de-
fendants were also charged with substantive cocaine
base violation, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and use of a
firearm in connection with drug trafficking under
18 U.S.C. § 924(c).'
The discovery order had been issued upon the
motion of defendant Shelton Martin, in which all
defendants joined. Martin sought discovery or dis-
missal, alleging that the government was prosecut-
ing him under the federal statutes rather than the
more lenient state statutes because of his race. The
government opposed the motion, and a hearing was
conducted on the issue. At the hearing, the defen-
dants offered as their only evidence an affidavit from
a paralegal employed by the Federal Public Defender.
The affidavit asserted that every defendant repre-
sented by the Federal Public Defender's Office who
was prosecuted under 21 U.S.C. § 841 and /or §
846 was African-American.The government claimed
that the affidavit alone was insufficient to demand
' Under 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b) (1988 & Supp. III 1991),
persons selling 50 grams or more of a mixture or sub-
stance containing cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a) must be imprisoned for at least 10 years and no
more than life. Conspiracy, governed by 21 U.S.C. § 846,
imposes the same penalty range as the § 841 (a) violation.
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) imposes an additional, consecutive 5-
year sentence without parole for the usage or carrying of
a firearm during and in relation to any drug trafficking
for force discovery. Judge Marshall disagreed and
ordered the government to:
(1) provide a list of all cases from the prior three
years in which the government charged both
cocaine base and firearms offenses; (2) identify
the race of the defendants in those cases; (3)
identify whether state, federal, or joint law en-
forcement authorities investigated each case;
and (4) explain the criteria used by the U.S.
Attorney's Office for deciding whether to bring
cocaine base cases federally.'
The government filed a motion to reconsider
the discovery order. At a hearing on the motion, the
government offered the sworn statements of a Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent, an ATF
agent, an Inglewood narcotics officer, and two As-
sistant United States District Attorneys stating that:
(1) the Office of the Federal Public Defender
represented at least five non-black cocaine base
defendants during the relevant time period; (2)
the government prosecuted many non-black
cocaine base defendants during 1991, the pe-
riod at issue in the report prepared by the para-
legal employed by the Office of the Public De-
fender; (3) the county district attorney's office
prosecuted many black cocaine base offenders;
(4) the government based its decision to charge
on the existence of federal firearms and narcot-
ics violations that met the guidelines of the
United States Attorney's Office, the strength
of the evidence, the deterrence value, the fed-
eral interest, the suspect's criminal history, and
other race-neutral criteria; and (5) socio-eco-
nomic factors account for the prevalence of
drugs in certain communities, as illustrated by
crime, as well as mandating longer sentences for repeat
violations and more dangerous weaponry. California law,
on the other hand, provides for a 3-5 year sentence for
cocaine base offenders, Cal.Health & Safety Code §
11351.5 (Deering 1993), and if firearms are involved, also
provides for a 2-4 year sentence. Id. § 11370.1.
2 United States v. Armstrong, 21 F.3d 1431, 1433 (9th
Cir. 1994).
black gangs in [the] south-central Los Angeles
area predominantly controlling the supply of
cocaine base.'
In response to the government's motion to re-
consider the discovery order, the defendants sub-
mitted a newspaper article from the Los Angeles
Times and two declarations by defense attorneys. The
newspaper article contended that blacks commit
disproportionately more cocaine base offenses than
other racial groups. The first defense attorney's dec-
laration summarized a conversation she had had with
a halfway house coordinator. In the conversation,
the coordinator concluded that, based on his expe-
rience, the number of white and minority cocaine
base addicts and dealers is approximately the same.
The second defense attorney's statement declared:
(1) [H]e has represented only blacks in federal
court on cocaine base charges; (2) he has never
heard of non-blacks being prosecuted in fed-
eral court on cocaine base charges; and (3) in
his conversation with unnamed state court
judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, he
has come to believe that the state prosecutes
many non-black cocaine base offenders in state
court
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district
court denied the motion to reconsider the discov-
ery order. The government notified the court of its
intention to appeal the denial of the motion and the
issuance of the discovery order. The district court
dismissed the indictments against all of the defen-
dants as a sanction for violating the discovery order,
but stayed the dismissals pending an appeal to the
Ninth Circuit.
The government appealed the district court's
finding that the affidavit from the Public Defender's
Office and a chart showing that all cocaine base pros-
ecutions in a one year period involved black defen-
dants established more than a mere allegation of
discriminatory intent. On this proof the district court
had granted discovery in the selective prosecution
claim.'
3 Id.
4 Id. at 1434.
SId. at 1436.
6 955 E2d 1296 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that in cases
where the defendant first raises a claim of selective pros-
ecution, he must present enough evidence to demonstrate
a reasonable inference of invidious discrimination).
HOLDING
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the district courts finding, and in so doing sustained
the "judicial suspicion" test articulated by United
States v. Redondo-Lemos6 but abolished the Redondo-
Lemos "reasonable inference" standard in favor of the
"colorable basis" standard of United States v. Bour-
geois.7 "[T]o obtain discovery on a selective prosecu-
tion claim, a defendant must present specific facts,
not mere allegations, which establish a colorable basis
for the existence of both discriminatory application
of a law and discriminatory intent on the part of the
government.'8
ANALYSIS/ APPLICATION
Both Bourgeois and Redondo-Lemos follow United
States v. Wayte."° Wayte held that selective prosecu-
tion claims should be reviewed according to ordi-
nary equal protection standards which require a
petitioner to show both discriminatory effect and
discriminatory motive." Nevertheless Bourgeois
notes that although"[t]he Wayte majority solidified
the elements of a meritorious selective prosecution
claim, [it] did not set out a discovery threshold."
2
Both Redondo-Lemos and Bourgeois represent the
Ninth Circuit's attempt to address the threshold
showing a defendant must make in order to obtain
discovery when the defendant makes a selective
prosecution claim. Armstrong provided the Ninth
Circuit with the opportunity to resolve the conflict
between Redondo-Lemos and Bourgeois.
Redondo-Lemos outlined a four-step process for
discovery on a claim of selective prosecution. First,
a prima facie showing of wrongful discrimination
must be made. This requirement is met if "the dis-
trict court develops a suspicion of unconstitutional
conduct on the basis of its own day-to-day observa-
tions," or upon the defendant presenting "enough
evidence to demonstrate a reasonable inference of
invidious discrimination."13 The second step affords
the prosecutor the opportunity to rebut the prima
facie showing with "overall case statistics" to which
both the district court and the defense can have ac-
7 964 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1992).
8 Id. at 939.
10 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
"Id. at 608-609.
12 Bourgeois, 955 F.2d at 939.
'3 Armstrong 21 F3d at 1434 (quoting Redondo-
Lemos, 955 F.2d at 1302).
cess.14 Third, if the district court, after reviewing the
rebuttal evidence, finds discriminatory impact by a
preponderance of the evidence, it must determine
whether the prosecutor's charging decision was
based on a discriminatory motive.'5 It is at this point
that there may be a "possibility of discovery by the
defense"' 6 Certain prosecution case files may be
subject to in camera review, and there may be lim-
ited discovery by the defense. Finally "[i]f, once the
district court examines discriminatory motive and
listens to government rebuttal evidence, the court
finds by preponderance of the evidence intentional
discrimination based on a suspect classification, it
may fashion an appropriate remedy."'
7
In Bourgeois, the defendant, rather than the
court, raised the issue of selective prosecution and
sought discovery. The Bourgeois court held that a
defendant could obtain discovery only by present-
ing "specific facts ... which establish a colorable
basis for the existence of both discriminatory appli-
cation of the law and discriminatory intent on the
part of the government."'8 Reviewing Redondo-Lemos
and Bourgeois, the Armstrong court identified the
question before it as whether to apply the Redondo-
Lemos judicial suspicion test, its reasonable infer-
ence test, or the Bourgeois colorable basis test. It
immediately eliminated the suspicion test because
the record revealed no possibility that the trial judge
granted discovery on the basis of her own day-to-
day observations.' 9 The Armstrong Court found that
the trial court's decision to grant discovery rested
on the evidence presented by the defendant, and
thus its decision "relied on the reasoning of Bour-
geois in analyzing the defendant's evidence, not its
own day-to-day observations."' Thus the court con-
cluded, "we must choose between the Redondo-
Lemos 'reasonable inference' test and the
Bourgeois'colorable basis test."'2'
The court candidly admitted that neither test
was "easily susceptible to further definition," but
decided that it would be more appropriate to apply
the colorable basis test. Armstrong was more analo-
gous to Bourgeois because the defendants in both
Armstrong and Bourgeois were challenging the pros-
ecutions, while Redondo-Lemos rested on a judge's
14 Id.
'1 Id. at 1434.
16 Id. at 1435.
17 Id.
18 Bourgeois, 955 F.2d at 939.
19 Armstrong, 21 F.3d at 1435.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 1436.
n Id.
suspicion.2 Thus the court held that "Bourgeois is
the law of [the Ninth Circuit] regarding the test for
determining whether to grant a defendant's motion
for discovery on a selective prosecution claim."
2 3
Applying the Bourgeois colorable basis test, the
Armstrong court found that "the district court abused
its discretion in concluding that the defendant's evi-
dence provided a colorable basis to believe that dis-
criminatory application of a law existed."24 The court
also found that the defense's proffer of a paralegal's
affidavit and the two sworn statements of the de-
fense attorneys did not constitute a colorable basis
for a finding of discrimination. 'The first affidavit
demonstrate[d] only that others have been pros-
ecuted, not that others similarly situated have not
. ,"25 Defendants must provide a colorable ba-
sis for believing that others similarly situated have
been prosecuted. The paralegal's affidavit did "not
speak to whether the Federal Public Defender had
other cases involving white defendants that did not
close during that period."2 And it did not speak to
the cases of non-indigent defendants with sufficient
resources to retain their own attorneys.2 7
The court found the two affidavits from the
defense attorneys equally flawed. The basis for this
finding was that the statements were hearsay, and
that they "fail[ed] to indicate whether the magni-
tude of the sales is similar to those of the defen-
dants in this case. ",8
Judge Reinhardt dissented, charging that the
majority had exceeded the scope of review, applied
the threshold showing of Bourgeois too harshly, and
erred in finding that the defendants had not met
the threshold showing.' Moreover, he said new evi-
dence supported the district court's order.
311
Judge Reinhardt Bourgeois cites for the proposi-
tion that "we review the district court's decision to
order discovery for abuse of discretion."3' In arguing
that appellate courts should reverse trial courts' de-
cisions to grant discovery only upon a clear showing
of error, Judge Reinhardt noted that district judges
are in the best position to safeguard the rights of
criminal defendants. "District judges are uniquely
situated to observe possible discrimination in the
government's charging decisions" and have "more
23 Id.
24 Id. at 1438.
21 Id. at 1436.
2f' Id. at 1437
2- Id. at 1437.
28 Id. at 1437.
2" Id. at 1439.
31 Id. at 1445.
31 Id. at 1439.
experience with the policies and practices of the
United States Attorney in their district" than do ei-
ther the appellate courts or individual defendants.
3
Upon review of the majority's analysis and ap-
plication of Bourgeois and Redondo-Lemos, Judge
Reinhardt found "[t]he effect of the majority's de-
cision is to create three highly artificial categories of
cases. "33 At one extreme are cases governed by Bour-
geois, where "a district judge completely ignores his
or her own experience and observations and makes
clear on the record that the discovery order is based
solely on the submission of the parties.' 4 At the other
extreme are the cases governed by Redondo-Lemos,
where "a district judge develops a suspicion of dis-
criminatory conduct based purely on his own day-
to-day observations and orders discovery or a hear-
ing without any prompting by the parties."35 And
the third category of cases was "in between these
extremes ... [wherie] a district judge's decision to
order discovery is based in part on the evidence sub-
mitted by the parties and in part on the judge's own
personal experience, observations, and suspicions."
36
Judge Reinhardt found Armstrong to be an ex-
ample of a case between the two extremes. In a foot-
note, he quoted the trial judge as she granted dis-
covery: "[T]hat is the problem I think that needs to
be addressed, because we do see a lot of the[se] cases
and one does ask why some are in state court and
some are being prosecuted in Federal court, and if
it's not based on race what's it based on?
3' 7
Judge Reinhardt found error even if the district
court judge did not rely on his or her own day-to-
day observations and focused only on the defendant's
evidence. Assuming "that people of all races com-
mit all types of crime," Judge Reinhardt found the
public defender's office study sufficient to raise a
strong inference of invidious discrimination.38 While
the flaws of the study make it "insufficient to sup-
port an ultimate showing of unconstitutional selec-
tive prosecution, the facts set forth are nonetheless
more than enough to support a finding of a colorable
basis for the claim that discrimination exist."39 He
also found that the majority impermissibly ignored
the two declarations by the defense .attorneys. "In
other contexts in which a party bears a lighter bur-
den of proof than a preponderance of the evidence,
the law has held that the lesser quantum of evidence
required also entails looser requirements regarding




3S Id. at 1439.
36 Id. at 1440.
31 Id. at 1440-1441 n2.
And finally, Judge Reinhardt pointed to new
evidence that was not before the district court and
thus was not in the record for review. He took judi-
cial notice of Richard Berk and Alec Campbell's
Preliminary Data on Race and Crack Charging Prac-
tices in Los Angeles.41 Judge Reinhardt found:
[Tihe Berk study reached some alarming con-
clusions, which are consistent with the
defendant's position here. Like the Federal Pub-
lic Defender study, the Berk study found that,
over a nearly two-year period, the United States
Attomey did not charge even a single white
person with sale of crack cocaine. By analyzing
state data, however, the Berk study also refuted
the majority's implicit assumption that non-
blacks simply do not commit these crimes. In-
deed, the data showed that the Los Angeles
'County District Attorney charged over two
hundred whites with sale of cocaine base dur-
ing this period. 42
Judge Reinhardt conduded that the "[t]he Berk
study.. . will certainly provide enough of an addi-
tional 'colorable basis' to support discovery if and
when the defendants file a renewed or amended
motion following remand."43
CONCLUSION
As noted earlier, the Ninth Circuit has agreed
to rehear this case en banc. Thus the application of
Armstrong is uncertain. Nevertheless it is clear that
to obtain discovery on the issue of selective pros-
ecution, a defendant must show specific facts to pro-
vide a colorable basis of malicious intent and dispar-
ate application of the law by the government. Just
how specific the facts and how colorable the basis
must be will be determined upon rehearing.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
David A. Kirkpatrick
Note: United States v. Armstrong, 21 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir.
1994), was reversed March 2, 1995 by United States v.
Armstrong, U.S.App. LEXIS 4040 (9th Cir. 1995).A dis-
cussion of the rehearing will be forthcoming in Volume 2
of the Race and Ethnic Ancestry Law Digest.
38 Id. at 1443.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 1444.
41 6 Fed. Sentencing Rep. 36 (1993).
42 Armstrong 21 F.3d at 1445.
43 Id. at 1446.
